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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, China’s large trade
surplus against other countries, as well as its
high domestic savings rate even relative to its
high investment rate, have resulted in a very
substantial foreign currency reserve that puts
the country in the position of a significant capi-
tal exporter. The huge amount of foreign cur-
rency assets held by the Chinese government
— near $1.9 trillion at the end of 2008 — and
a breathtaking series of acquisitions made by
Chinese firms overseas are now salient items in
international business reporting and public dis-
cussion. China’s new posture as an exporter of
capital has also ushered in a new phase of de-
velopment in the country’s international tax re-
gime; ‘‘outbound’’ tax policy — how Chinese
corporate and individual residents are taxed on
income earned abroad — increasingly attracts
the attention of taxpayers and practitioners.
The foreign tax credit (FTC) system stands
at the center of this area of law. The Enterprise
Income Tax Law (EIT Law) adopted in 2007
inherits most of the FTC provisions from prior
law, while also introducing a number of inno-
vations. The most obvious among the innova-
tions is a provision allowing Chinese enter-
prises to obtain indirect FTC for tax paid by
their foreign subsidiaries.1 While this provision
has understandably attracted much attention,
and practitioners have been looking forward to
more detailed regulations prescribing its work-
ings,2 it is not as though China had a well-
functioning FTC system in place already, and
simply needed to add the concept of deemed-
tax-paid to that system.3 Quite the contrary, un-
der prior law, a large number of issues that af-
fected the basic workings of even the direct
FTC system were either unresolved, or inad-
equately resolved. Permitting indirect FTCs
will multiply the occasions on which these fun-
damental issues will arise, as well as the layers
of uncertainty they generate.
Some of these prior problems are technical
in nature. For example, a crude formula for the
foreign tax credit limitation malfunctioned 4 in
implementing the per-country limitation when
losses were generated by some of the taxpay-
1 EIT Law, Art. 24.
2 See the Enterprise Income Tax Law Implementation
Regulations (State Council, Decree No. 512, Nov. 28,
2007) (herein referred to as the ‘‘EIT Law IR’’), Art. 80
(direct and indirect ownership must exceed 20% for
deemed paid credit provision to apply; further regulations
to be issued regarding ownership requirements.)
3 The concept of deemed-tax-paid has long been
present in China’s income tax treaties.
4 This crude formula has been inherited by the EIT
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er’s operations. Because regulations issued by the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and State Administration
of Taxation (SAT) did not address how such problems
were to be dealt with, taxpayers and local tax bureaus
had to come up with their own solutions.5 But other
issues in the old FTC system were technical only in
appearance; they would be regarded as serious policy
issues in countries with advanced income tax systems.
Without attempting completeness, one could identify
at least the following items as being of policy signifi-
cance and in need of resolution in the near future:6
• How the source of income is determined. While
the basic EIT regulations contain certain rules on
the source of income,7 they are very incomplete.
For example, other than a rule for the transfer of
equity investments, there are no rules for sourcing
gain (or loss) from the transfer of intangible prop-
erty, be it non-equity securities, intellectual prop-
erty, or other rights. The rule for transfers of in-
ventory, which sources income from such trans-
fers to the place where ‘‘transactional activities’’
occur,8 is also badly in need of clarification.
These rules directly determine the FTC conse-
quences for Chinese taxpayers entering into the
relevant transactions, and therefore could affect
the very decisions for entering into them.
• How expenses (including interest and R&D ex-
penses) are allocated to a taxpayer’s activities
in different countries. While some language in
the EIT Law and implementing regulations could
be read as requiring taxpayers to trace expenses to
the particular income generated,9 it is unclear
whether this is seriously implemented. More of-
ten, expenses are allocated as recorded on the
books, which could lead to mismeasurements of
income as well as tax avoidance opportunities.
• What tax accounting methods should be ap-
plied to determine foreign income or loss. Al-
though the integrity of an income tax system gen-
erally requires that the same set of tax accounting
rules apply to compute income and loss world-
wide, following this principle in China is prob-
lematic because of the incompleteness of Chinese
tax rules. Domestically, this incompleteness often
results, in real practice, in computations of in-
come and loss that are to the taxpayers’ disadvan-
tage. If foreign income and loss were also subject
to this conservative approach, domestic tax liabil-
ity on foreign income could end up higher than it
should be.
• Whether the per-country limitation on apply-
ing FTCs will have exceptions. The EIT Law
Implementation Regulations state that while the
per-country limitation generally applies to claims
of FTCs, MOF and SAT may prescribe excep-
tions.10 Clearly, the government realizes that the
per-country limitation may be too stringent and in
conflict with policy goals with respect to out-
bound investments in some circumstances. What
these policy goals are, and how the per-country
limitation may be correspondingly relaxed, re-
main open to discussion.
• Whether profits and losses from different
countries are allowed to offset each other.
This article will focus on this last item for two rea-
sons. First, the issue of loss offsets is unfamiliar to
many Chinese tax practitioners, and its relation to the
FTC is not always understood. Second, corresponding
to the unfamiliarity and subtlety of the issue, an im-
portant statutory provision in the EIT Law, which pro-
hibits the use of foreign branch losses to offset domes-
tic income, has gone widely unnoticed. In other
words, among all the issues of policy significance
listed above, a policy decision regarding the last item,
limitations on loss offset, has already been made and
encoded in the statute, while the importance of the de-
cision is still insufficiently recognized and its merit
largely undiscussed. Bringing attention to the issue is
thus an urgent, albeit a partially remedial, matter.
However, the extent to which profits and losses
from different countries are allowed to mutually offset
each other has something in common with all other
policy issues (whether or not listed above): its resolu-
tion requires an articulation of China’s tax policy (or
policies) towards the different types of outbound in-
vestment.11 Does the tax regime aim to encourage
overseas business ventures? Or is it neutral with re-
spect to whether Chinese taxpayers decide to invest in
China or abroad? Or are overseas investments per-
ceived to threaten the domestic tax base, and, there-
fore, the preservation of fiscal revenue is given high
5 See, e.g., Beijing State Tax Bureau, Jingguoshui [1998] 063
(instruction to disregard FTC limitation formula when there is a
domestic loss).
6 There are policy issues (e.g., what types of taxes are credit-
able) that are not always under active consideration even in ad-
vanced income tax systems. While what taxes are creditable also
awaits clarification under Chinese regulations, it may be argued
that it is not really a live policy issue.
7 EIT Law IR, Art. 7.
8 Id., Clause (1).
9 See EIT Law, Art. 8 (expenses must be related to the earning
of (gross) income to be deductible); EIT Law IR, Art. 27 (the re-
lationship between expenses and income must be direct).
10 EIT Law IR, Art. 78.
11 Different policies may apply to different types of invest-
ments. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI) may be
treated differently from foreign portfolio investment.
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priority in designing outbound tax rules? I hope to il-
lustrate, through the particular example of the loss
limitation rules, the difference between these policy
goals.
In the first section below, I describe the statutory
prohibition on the use of foreign losses to offset do-
mestic income, the problem with its purported ratio-
nale, its predecessor under prior law, and basic ways
to assess the provision. In the second section below, I
show that the best argument for the limitation on for-
eign losses is that it avoids improper results with re-
spect to the FTC mechanisms. However, such results
can be avoided through other means, such as a loss
recapture or resourcing device, which not only more
accurately measures income but also has been prac-
ticed elsewhere in China’s tax system. Moreover, I ar-
gue that there is no good case for other types of limi-
tations on cross-border loss offsets either. In the final
section, I discuss why, among aversion, neutrality, and
an attitude of encouragement towards outbound in-
vestments, China’s tax authorities might be expected
to exhibit more often the first type of orientation.
EIT LAW ARTICLE 17 AND ITS
POSSIBLE EXTENSION
Article 17 of the EIT Law states that when an en-
terprise computes its tax liability based on the income
and losses of all of its operations, the losses of a busi-
ness unit outside China are not allowed to offset prof-
its of business units within China. No such limitation
existed under the previous tax regime for foreign-
invested enterprises. Even though, as discussed below,
a related limitation was deployed in the regime appli-
cable to domestically funded enterprises, it was laid
out only in a ministerial circular and did not have the
status of a statutory rule. The appearance in the EIT
Law of this limitation on foreign losses is thus strik-
ing. Although, in China, there is still no official re-
cording of legislative history in reliance on which leg-
islative intent can be used in legal interpretation, there
is an official annotation of the EIT Law published
shortly after the Law’s adoption. The annotation con-
tains a discussion of Article 17 and justifies the law
on the ground that foreign branch losses are easy to
manipulate and difficult to verify.12
This justification is difficult to accept for a number
of reasons. Manipulation of losses should be coun-
tered by applying proper accounting rules. Even if,
generally, auditing the income and losses of foreign
operations is difficult, the degree of difficulty depends
on actual circumstances and is not always insuper-
able. It does not make sense, therefore, to deal with
administrative difficulties that arise only in some cir-
cumstances by uniformly denying taxpayers the right
to the proper measurement of their income whenever
foreign branch losses could affect the computation of
such income. Moreover, as a matter of general prac-
tice, China has not dealt with administrative difficul-
ties by introducing distortions into fundamental tax
law. For example, like many countries that have only
recently implemented the value added tax (VAT),
China has had difficulty combating fraud in tax refund
claims on exports. Partly as a result of this, China has
long abandoned full zero-rating on exports in practice
and offers only partial refunds. However, the basic
VAT regulations still provide for the right to zero-
rating on exports, subject to exceptions made by the
government.13 Moreover, the adjustment of refund
rates has generally been accomplished through tempo-
rary regulations. It is hard to believe that manipulation
of foreign losses in the income tax context constitutes
a problem of a far greater magnitude, requiring a
more drastic, statutory solution.
The justification of the limitation on foreign branch
losses in terms of administrative difficulties also has
problematic implications. If such losses are easily ma-
nipulated, should they be disallowed from offsetting
foreign income as well? The official annotation under-
mines its own argument in this regard by stating that
a foreign loss may still offset income arising from the
same foreign country.14 This leaves it unclear not only
whether loss and income from different foreign coun-
tries might mutually offset each other, but also what
type of reasoning one is to follow.
Aside from the ‘‘official’’ exegesis of Article 17,
another approach to its interpretation is to consider its
predecessor in a MOF/SAT announcement issued in
1997 (‘‘Circular 116’’).15 That document was issued
under the previous enterprise income tax regime for
domestically owned firms and did not apply to
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs were subject to no
loss limitation with respect to foreign income or
losses). The circular stated that, in computing taxable
income, losses may offset profits among foreign op-
12 Shi Yaobin, Sun Ruibiao, and Liu Zhao, Annotations and a
User’s Guide to the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s
Republic of China (zhonghuarenmingongheguo qiyesuodeshuifa
shiyijishiyongzhinan) (Law Press: Beijing; first printing Apr.
2007), pp. 81-2: ‘‘Tax administration for foreign branches is rela-
tively difficult; the motive to create artificial losses through ma-
nipulation thus easily arises, resulting in encroachment of the do-
mestic tax base.’’
13 See Provisional Regulations on the Value Added Tax (as re-
vised pursuant to State Council Order No. 538, Nov. 10, 2008),
Art. 2, clause (3).
14 Shi, Sun, and Liu, Annotations and a User’s Guide, fn. 12,
above, at 82.
15 MOF/SAT, ‘‘(Revised) Temporary Measures for Computing
and Collecting Tax on Foreign Income,’’ Caishuizi [1997] 116
(11/25/97).
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erations, but there may be no offsetting of losses
against profits in either direction across the Chinese
border.16 There are thus some significant differences
between the Circular 116 provision and Article 17 of
the EIT Law. However, the former points to a set of
concerns in light of which Article 17 can be better un-
derstood.
We could start by noting that Article 17 does not
speak in terms of the source of income and loss. Gen-
erally, a foreign branch could have both Chinese- and
foreign-source income, as could a domestic branch.17
Circular 116, by contrast, refers not to foreign or do-
mestic branches but to profit and losses from inside
and outside China. It is natural to interpret this more
precisely as addressing foreign- or Chinese-source in-
come and loss. Understood this way, the Circular 116
provision is a rule of more general application, be-
cause it addresses the deductibility of a wider range
of foreign losses. For example, under current EIT Law
source rules, a loss from the sale of a foreign compa-
ny’s stock should be treated as foreign-source.18
Whereas Article 17 is silent with respect to this type
of loss, Circular 116 would limit its deductibility
against domestic income. Moreover, as we will see
below, one can argue in favor of such a limitation in
terms of the operation of FTC mechanisms, once it is
interpreted as addressing foreign-source losses.
We should, of course, also note that Circular 116
explicitly prohibits using a domestic-source loss to
offset foreign-source income, while permitting the
offsetting of loss against income across foreign opera-
tions, including across foreign countries.19 Thus, not
only can Article 17 be subsumed under the limitation
on foreign-source loss from offsetting domestic in-
come, that limitation itself can be seen in the context
of a broader set of limitations. Specifically, there are
three distinct limitations:
• Limitation (1): Foreign-source loss cannot offset
domestic-source income
• Limitation (2): Domestic-source loss cannot off-
set foreign-source income
• Limitation (3): Foreign-source loss from one op-
eration (or country) cannot offset foreign-source
income from a different operation (or country).20
In developing detailed rules regarding the computa-
tion of foreign-source income and FTC limitations
(which are yet to be issued under the EIT Law), it is
not unlikely that the government would consider all
three types of limitations.21 To the extent that the
prior law’s adoption of both limitations (1) and (2) (in
Circular 116) has not been debated and criticized,
both limitations may be continued. Although Circular
116 explicitly rejected limitation (3), it clearly could
be revived if fear about manipulation of foreign losses
is genuine. Moreover, there has been an absence of
detailed rules dealing with the consequences of loss
offset among foreign operations. As discussed in Sec-
tion II below, such detailed rules may be perceived by
some as too complex in light of the per-country limi-
tation on foreign tax credits, giving another reason for
reconsidering limitation (3).
In other words, Article 17 may not be the end of the
story in terms of limitations on foreign loss. An un-
derstanding and evaluation of Article 17 may require
understanding and evaluating its possible extension.
Moreover, if, as the next section argues, such exten-
sion would be unjustified, its adoption should also be
prevented, if possible.
The starting point for any evaluation of the above
limitations should be the acknowledgment that all
three potentially result in the overstatement of a tax-
payer’s worldwide income when applied to a particu-
lar tax period. They thus potentially increase a taxpay-
er’s liability. Prima facie, each of these limitations
violates the so-called principle of horizontal equity:
taxpayers with the same income are taxed differently
depending on the mix of where their profits and losses
are earned. The idea that persons with the same in-
come should be taxed in the same way, no matter
where the income is earned, has at least traditionally
been offered as a justification for adopting worldwide
taxation in the first place.
16 Id., ¶2.
17 See EIT Law IR, Article 7, on source of income rules. Pre-
sumably, however, the purported concern of Article 17 relates
mainly to foreign-source losses, because the Chinese-source loss
of a foreign branch should not be difficult to verify.
18 EIT Law IR, Art. 7, clause (3).
19 In a prior document repealed by Circular 116 (MOF and
SAT, Caishui [1995] 56), a provision disallowed offsets between
‘‘losses and profits of foreign enterprises.’’ It was unclear whether
this merely stated the tautology that the tax liabilities of distinct
foreign legal entities could not be computed on a combined base,
or whether it disallowed loss offsets among foreign (branch) op-
erations of the same taxpayer. This language was removed in Cir-
cular 116. Moreover, local tax bureaus have explicitly interpreted
Circular 116 as allowing loss offsets across foreign countries. See
Shandong Provincial Local Tax Bureau, Notice regarding Several
Problems in Enterprise Income Tax Administration (Ludishuifa
[1999]160, Dec. 3, 1999).
20 In the discussion below, we assume that domestic losses are
generally allowed to offset domestic income, subject to specific
exceptions, such as the disallowance of deductions related to non-
taxable income. This assumption holds under the regulations is-
sued under the EIT Law so far.
21 Given that limitations on loss offset work to the detriment of
taxpayers, it may be questioned whether such further regulatory
extension is authorized. The MOF and SAT probably regard Ar-
ticle 20 of the EIT Law as sufficient authorization (‘‘The specific
scope and criteria for determining income and deductions and the
tax treatment of capital assets in this chapter shall be prescribed
by the finance and tax agencies under the State Council.’’).
Tax Management International Journal
4  2009 Tax Management Inc., a subsidiary of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
ISSN 0090-4600
More importantly, the limitations violate standards
of efficiency, such as capital export neutrality: foreign
income is disadvantaged relative to domestic income
if it cannot be offset by domestic loss; risky foreign
investments are disadvantaged if losses from such in-
vestments cannot offset domestic or other foreign in-
come. The limitations are thus non-neutral with re-
spect to domestic and foreign investments.
Because equity and efficiency considerations go to
the heart of any system taxing worldwide income,
limitations on loss offset should not be adopted
lightly. Nonetheless, at least versions of Limitation (1)
seem to have been adopted in countries other than
China (e.g., Germany 22 and Australia 23. Moreover,
there is an argument in favor of Limitation (1) (and
potentially Limitation (3)) that counters the funda-
mental equity and efficiency considerations. The argu-
ment is that foreign income is primarily subject to for-
eign (source country) taxation, and the resident coun-
try has at best residual taxing power. There is thus a
meaningful distinction between the part of the tax
base that is domestic from the part that is foreign. To
allow foreign loss to offset domestic income would
likely encroach on the domestic tax base, and there-
fore is unacceptable from a revenue perspective. This,
of course, is the reason why no country allows unlim-
ited FTCs, and all countries generally limit the FTC
to the amount of domestic tax that would be imposed
on foreign income.
The key to this argument is how the encroachment
on the domestic tax base occurs. As shown in the sec-
tion below, it is more credible to explain this in terms
of how the FTC mechanism works than to allege ma-
nipulation of foreign losses. Even for the real problem
created by FTC rules, however, there are better solu-
tions than limiting the deductibility of foreign losses.
Therefore, the argument does not succeed. Moreover,
the argument also fails to justify Limitations (2) and
(3). Although special rules may be needed to accom-
modate any loss offset across borders, the increase in
technical complexity is hardly unmanageable.
LOSS LIMITATION VERSUS LOSS
RECAPTURE
How unlimited loss offsets could result in en-
croachment on the domestic tax base has to be under-
stood in connection with FTC rules. We illustrate this
through the scenarios depicted in the following charts,
in all of which the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and foreign tax rates of 25% are assumed.
Chart I depicts a scenario where a PRC taxpayer
records in country X a loss of 1000 in Year 1 and
profits of 1000 in Year 2. The taxpayer has PRC-
source income of 1000 in each of the two years. Chart
I assumes that, under X’s tax law, X-source loss in
Year 1 offsets X-source income in year 2 in determin-
ing tax liability in X; therefore, no tax is paid in X for
the 1000 of income in Year 2. It further assumes that,
if PRC tax rules were to prohibit the offsetting of for-
eign loss against domestic income, it would allow a
carryover of the unused foreign loss from year 1 to
year 2. With these assumptions, the chart shows the
taxpayer’s taxable income and PRC tax liability for
years 1 and 2, computed either with or without Limi-
tation (1) discussed in the last section (which prohib-
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As Chart I shows, under either method there is no
encroachment on the PRC domestic tax base: over
two years, there is net X-source income of zero and
PRC-source income of 2000, and the right amount of
tax (500) is collected from the domestic income. What
the loss limitation does is to defer the loss deduction
and therefore accelerate income and tax liability, in
deviation from the actual sequence of worldwide in-
come realized by the taxpayer.
Chart II contains the standard illustration of how
basic FTC rules could lead to diminution of the do-
mestic tax base in the face of a foreign loss. While
keeping the taxpayer’s income and loss profile the
same, the scenario in Chart II assumes that, under
22 See National Foreign Trade Council, ‘‘The NFTC Foreign In-
come Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Part
Two: Relief of International Double Taxation,’’ p. 260 (with re-
spect to German tax rules, ‘‘foreign branch losses are not deduct-
ible . . . branch losses can be carried forward for offset against fu-
ture income of the respective branch. Thus, a benefit for the
branch loss, albeit delayed, is ultimately obtained.’’).
23 See Ault and Arnold, ‘‘Comparative Income Taxation: A
Structural Analysis’’ (2d Edition) (Kluwer Law Int’l 2004), p. 367.
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country X’s law, the loss in Year 1 does not offset the
income in Year 2 in determining tax liability in X.
There are a number of real-world circumstances
where this might occur. The income from Year 2 may
not be subject to net-income taxation (e.g., it is port-
folio income). Or it could be that the X-source income
consists of the repatriation of profit generated by a
separate subsidiary (thus, credit for the X tax is
claimed on a deemed-paid basis). Or one can imagine
that our charts have oversimplified, and the foreign in-
come earned in Year 2 is from a different foreign
country, Y, which, of course, would not consider the
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If, for any of these reasons, country X tax is paid in
Year 2, and if a FTC is allowed for such tax in China,
then over two years only 250 of PRC tax is paid on
the 2000 of PRC-source income. This is shown in the
‘‘No loss limitation’’ column of Chart II. The country
X loss in Year 1 is genuine and there is no manipula-
tion. However, foreign-source income is effectively
overstated over time, and domestic income under-
stated. Consequently, the taxpayer gets to use tax paid
to X to shelter PRC-source income from tax. By con-
trast, Limitation (1) treats the taxpayer as having zero
X-source income in Year 2, turning the 250 of X tax
paid into excess credits to be carried over into future
years. The PRC-source income of 2000 is conse-
quently fully taxed in the PRC.
Chart II, therefore, appears to justify Limitation (1)
by its function to protect the PRC tax base. But there
is an alternative solution to the problem,24 as illus-
trated in the ‘‘No loss limitation’’ column in Chart III.
Instead of a limitation on the loss-offset during Year
1, a rule could provide that to the extent foreign loss
has offset domestic income in Year 1, subsequent
foreign-source income should be recharacterized as
domestic-source income for FTC purposes. Thus, in
our example, if the 1000 of X-source income in Year
2 is recharacterized as PRC-source income, the 250 of
X tax paid would not be creditable and must be car-
ried over, similar to the results under loss limitation.
Consequently, the right amount of tax is collected on
the 2000 of PRC-source income over two years and
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24 This is the approach adopted in the United States since 1976.
See U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, §904(f).
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Comparing the ‘‘No loss limitation’’ and ‘‘Limita-
tion (1) applies’’ columns of Chart III, one sees that
one difference between the loss recapture and the loss
limitation approaches is that the latter defers the de-
duction for the foreign loss to Year 2 and thus accel-
erates income and tax liability. The latter approach
thus gets the timing of income wrong, relative to the
former approach. But more importantly, if the tax-
payer does not generate foreign-source profit after
Year 1, the loss limitation rule would completely fail
to recognize this loss for tax purposes. Although the
domestic tax base is preserved, it is done at the ex-
pense of a serious mismeasurement of the taxpayer’s
income overall. The recapture approach avoids this
problem.
It may be asked, therefore, why China should not
adopt the loss recapture approach, given that it both
protects the domestic tax base and more accurately
measures worldwide income, thus avoiding the loss
limitation’s potential to discourage foreign invest-
ment.
An answer that cannot be plausibly given is that a
recapture mechanism is too complex and alien to the
Chinese system. China’s tax accounting has already
practiced the recapture approach to deal with a prob-
lem within the domestic context. Under the tax sys-
tem before the EIT Law took effect, foreign enter-
prises and foreign-invested Chinese enterprises (FIEs)
received tax preferences depending on the nature of
their Chinese operations as well as the locations and
timing of such operations. Therefore, a foreign firm’s
or an FIE’s different operations in China could have
been subject to different tax rates. Both types of firms
were nonetheless allowed to file combined tax returns
that aggregated branch profits and losses. This created
the possibility that loss from a low-taxed operation
would offset income from a high-taxed one. A special
rule, therefore, required that if this happened, subse-
quent income earned by the low-taxed operation
would be first recharacterized as income from the
high-taxed operation.25
The concept of loss recapture is also relevant to as-
sessing the need for imposing Limitations (2) and (3)
described in the last section. For example, one argu-
ment for Limitation (3), regarding loss offsets among
foreign countries, may be the following. Because
China adopts the per-country limitation on the claim
of FTCs, there is normally residual Chinese tax col-
lectible on income from low-tax countries. Income
from high-tax countries, on the other hand, would nor-
mally not give rise to residual Chinese taxation. If
losses from high-tax countries are allowed to offset in-
come from low-tax countries, China may lose the rev-
enue that it is otherwise entitled to collect from in-
come earned in low-tax countries. Clearly, this con-
cern is similar to the concern about aggregating
profits and losses from branches subject to different
tax rates, and Chinese law already shows that it can
be dealt with by a loss recapture, as opposed to a loss
limitation, approach.26
It seems hard at first to find any justification for
Limitation (2), which prohibits the use of domestic
losses to reduce foreign income. It fails to display
neutrality with respect to domestic and foreign invest-
ments (which both fairness and efficiency seem to re-
quire), and it does nothing to protect the domestic tax
base. But there is a surprising argument for Limitation
(2): when the FTC mechanism is taken into account,
the limitation sometimes delivers results that are more
favorable for taxpayers, as well as conceptually more
correct. This can be seen in the scenario depicted in
Chart IV.
Unlike the previous charts, the Chinese taxpayer
here realizes income of 1000 from country X in both
Years 1 and 2, but has a domestic loss and income of
1000, respectively, in the two years. The penultimate
row contrasts the ‘‘No loss limitation’’ approach with
the ‘‘Limitation (2) applies’’ approach, while the last
row contrasts the latter with a ‘‘No limitation but with
recapture’’ approach. The penultimate row of Chart
IV shows that when a domestic loss offsets foreign in-
come, foreign income may be understated and domes-
tic income overstated over time. Under the pure ‘‘No
loss limitation’’ approach, the taxpayer is treated as
having 1000 each of domestic and foreign income
over the course of two years, whereas in fact it has
zero domestic income and 2000 of foreign income.
This could prevent the taxpayer from using foreign
tax credits otherwise available: in the scenario de-
picted, the taxpayer has 250 of excess credits at the
end of Year 2. If Limitation (2) applies, by contrast,
the mix of domestic and foreign income may be more
accurately computed, and the taxpayer can end up
paying less tax worldwide compared to the pure ‘‘No
loss limitation’’ approach.
25 See Implementation Rules for the Income Tax Law on Enter-
prises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (State
Council Order No. 85, 1991), Arts. 91 and 93.
26 While Circular 116 permitted loss offsets across foreign
countries, it did not propose a loss recapture system similar to that
used for foreign and foreign-invested enterprises operating in
China.
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Even in this scenario, however, Limitation (2) is
not without problems: if the taxpayer subsequently re-
alizes no domestic income that absorbs the carried-
over domestic loss, it would have an unused 1000 of
loss carryover, which could be just as bad as the un-
used FTC under the pure ‘‘No loss limitation’’ ap-
proach. Now compare both approaches with the ‘‘No
limitation but with recapture’’ approach in the last
row. Under the recapture rule used here, domestic in-
come is recharacterized as foreign income to the ex-
tent a domestic loss previously offset foreign income,
thus allowing the full crediting of foreign tax paid.
The use of this rule allows the accurate measurement,
over time, of both the total worldwide income and the
proportions of domestic and foreign income within
this total. Loss recapture again seems superior to loss
limitation.27
The conclusions of this section can be summarized
as follows:
(1) Despite their apparent violation of equity and
efficiency criteria, the three types of loss limita-
tions described above may reflect intelligible con-
cerns about protecting the tax base (Limitations
(1) and (3)) or simply preventing incorrect results
(Limitation (2)), once the functioning of the FTC
mechanism is taken into account;
(2) However, all these concerns could be addressed
through a loss recapture system, which more ac-
curately measures income and, therefore, appears
more neutral and equitable;
(3) Such a recapture system is not alien to the Chi-
nese tax system;
(4) In light of these conclusions, the enactment of
Article 17 of the EIT Law indeed seems unfortu-
nate, and it seems important to prevent its exten-
sion, a la Circular 116, in future regulations con-
cerning the computation of foreign income and
FTC limits.
OUTBOUND TAX POLICY GOALS:
NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS
Throughout our discussion in the last two sections,
we have taken for granted the goal of correctly mea-
suring income so as not to create tax disadvantages
for Chinese firms’ foreign investments. The stance of
neutrality with respect to choices between foreign and
domestic investments is reflected in many of the in-
ternational aspects of the EIT Law. The general
framework of worldwide taxation combined with the
FTC, for example, as well as specialized regimes such
as that regarding controlled foreign corporations,28
are generally understood as embodying neutrality
norms.29 On the other hand, questions could be
raised: putting aside what the law says, what is Chi-
na’s current tax policy towards outbound invest-
ments? And whatever official statements have been
made in this regard, what should that policy be? After
all, neutrality need not be regarded as a goal in itself,
let alone the only goal; one could always question
whether the stance of neutrality is appropriate in Chi-
na’s actual circumstances.
Consider an easily understood, albeit atheoretical,
trichotomy of possible policy effects that outbound
tax rules may achieve: (1) encouraging overseas in-
vestments; (2) being neutral with respect to such in-
vestments; and (3) discouraging such investments.
Which of these effects should China aim for? The tri-
chotomy is atheoretical because it only describes the
effect of different rules without mentioning their un-
derlying rationale. In theoretical discussions, econo-
mists have used different principles of efficiency to
justify rules that have effects of either type (1) or type
(2).30 For example, rules that exempt income earned
on overseas investments from domestic taxation,
which could have the effect of encouraging overseas
investments over domestic ones, are associated with
the so-called principle of capital import neutrality
(CIN).31 They are justified on the ground of their po-
tential to induce efficient patterns of savings. Alterna-
tively, rules that subject a given taxpayer’s income,
wherever derived, to the same rate of tax are associ-
ated with the principle of capital export neutrality
(CEN). They are shown to induce efficient allocations
of capital, if certain assumptions are met. These effi-
ciency criteria often cannot be met simultaneously,
and economists debate about which criterion it is
more reasonable to pursue, given real world circum-
stances.
Rules with effects of type (3), i.e., those that dis-
courage overseas investments, are normally not justi-
27 Recapture of domestic losses was enacted in the United
States through Internal Revenue Code §904(g), effective in 2007.
28 See EIT Law, Art. 45, and EIT Law IR, Art. 116-8.
29 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Department (2000), ‘‘The Deferral of
Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A
Policy Study’’ (available at http://www.treas.gov/offıces/tax-
policy/library/subpartf.pdf), especially Chapter 3.
30 For accessible overviews of such discussions, see Shaviro,
‘‘Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax
Policy?’’ 60 Tax L. Rev. 155 (2007), and Altshuler, ‘‘Recent De-
velopments in the Debate on Deferral,’’ 87 Tax Notes 255 (2000).
31 If home countries all exempted their residents’ overseas in-
vestment income, income that could be earned from any given in-
vestment opportunity would be subject to the same rate of tax —
that of the country where that investment was located — regard-
less of the country in which the investor resided. All sources from
which capital can be ‘‘imported,’’ therefore, would be put on an
equal footing.
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fied on efficiency grounds. Even if investments made
overseas instead of at home may reduce the amount
of tax revenue collected in the home country, this is
generally not regarded as sufficient reason to discour-
age investments abroad.32 However, the pursuit of
revenue motivates tax agencies, and if, in order to pre-
serve revenue, such agencies adopt rules that effec-
tively discourage foreign investments (whether or not
intending such effects), no one should be greatly sur-
prised. Our earlier question could thus be reformu-
lated as: to what extent is the design of outbound tax
rules in China determined by the norms of economic
efficiency, and to what extent is such design driven in-
stead by the desire to preserve revenue?
The principles of CEN and CIN are known in
China and are supposed to have some influence on the
design of international income taxation.33 As men-
tioned above, neutrality with respect to decisions to
invest in China or overseas also informs the overall
structure of outbound tax rules. However, as we have
seen in connection with Article 17 of the EIT Law
(and its predecessor in Circular 116), there are also
rules that appear largely driven by the desire to pre-
serve revenue. What explains the choice between
these conflicting objectives?
In reflecting on these questions, one inevitably
faces the fact that the pursuit of efficiency as recom-
mended by standard economic theory may seem dis-
tinctly unpromising in China. Efficiency in interna-
tional taxation requires minimizing tax-induced dis-
tortions to otherwise efficient allocations of resources.
However, the allocation of resources in the realm of
Chinese outbound investments is subject to serious
regulatory distortions, even before the introduction of
taxes. The most obvious aspect of this is China’s capi-
tal control regime. Taxpayers are not free to make for-
eign investments, and therefore could not freely
choose between domestic and foreign investments.
Moreover, they are not free to choose between differ-
ent locations for foreign investments either.34 It is not
clear whether the heavy government approval require-
ments to which outbound investments are subject bias
the choice of such investments in any systematic way,
or whether they simply impose uniform transactional
(‘‘red tape’’) costs. Nonetheless, it is worth remem-
bering that the range of transactions that China’s out-
bound tax policy affects has already been narrowed by
other regulatory requirements, and that the transac-
tions in this range may already represent different
choices from what the firms would have freely made.
A less obvious obstacle to the pursuit of efficiency
objectives in China’s outbound tax policy is the fact
that most entities that obtain permission to invest
overseas are large state-owned enterprises (SOEs),35
which dominate both foreign direct investment and
foreign portfolio investment. There are reasons to
think that, as taxpayers, SOEs respond to taxes differ-
ently from private firms. This is because, in addition
to collecting tax from them, the government also
owns the SOEs. It is well known that the government
and SOE managers bargain as to how much of SOEs’
profits are to be distributed to the government as
shareholder.36 This bargaining tends to carry over to
tax administration, too, so that paying tax is some-
times regarded as a way of making distributions.37 If,
then, an SOE manager can ‘‘get credit’’ for tax paid
— because any tax paid benefits the public fisc just
like a dividend distributed — the manager may be less
averse to paying taxes than private firms. Conversely,
an SOE manager is also more likely to obtain a spe-
cial tax exemption from the government, because he
can argue that less tax paid only increases retained
earnings, which belong to the government anyway.
In short, weak corporate governance and protection
of the rights of the SOEs’ shareholder — the govern-
ment — may render SOEs’ response to taxes quite
different from what is standardly assumed in eco-
nomic theory. In the international context, a sense of
skepticism could thus arise: are policy instruments
that are neutral for private firms necessarily neutral
for SOEs? Do policy instruments that encourage for-
eign investments for private firms necessarily encour-
age SOEs’ foreign investments?
In light of both China’s regulatory restrictions on
the range of outbound transactions that can take place,
and the special class of taxpayers (i.e., SOEs) that
dominate existing outbound transactions, it may be
difficult for principles of efficiency to gain wide sym-
pathy among tax policymakers, tax administrators,
and even taxpayers themselves. This makes it more
32 The idea that foreign tax paid on foreign investments consti-
tutes a cost to the home country of the investor is associated with
the concept of ‘‘national neutrality.’’ The concept has had few ad-
vocates. See Shaviro, fn. 30 above, for discussion.
33 See SAT Staff, ‘‘Choice of Policy Goals in Taxing the For-
eign Income of Chinese Residents,’’ Int’l Tax’n (Shewai Shuiwu),
2006(4), pp. 27-30.
34 For the most recent proposal for subjecting foreign invest-
ment projects to central or provincial government approval re-
quirements, see Ministry of Commerce, Administrative Measures
for Overseas Investments (Draft) (http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/xxfb/200901/20090105993774.html), published on Jan. 7,
2009, for public comment.
35 See Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung, and Minyuan Zhao,
‘‘Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,’’ J.
Int’l Bus. Stud., 39(3) (2008), pp. 337-350.
36 See the World Bank, SOE Dividends: How Much and to
Whom? (World Bank Policy Note, 2005), available at
www.worldbank.org.cn/english/content/SOE_En_bill.pdf.
37 See Liu Zuo, ‘‘SOE’s Switch from Surrendering Profits to
Paying Taxes,’’ Tax’n Res. (Shuiwu Yanjiu) 2004(10), pp. 27-33.
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understandable that the tax authority would often
adopt measures that give priority to the protection of
revenue. The past and present limitations on loss off-
set that we examined in the previous sections look
wrong in that they deviate from what standard theo-
ries recommend. One could harbor well-justified res-
ervations, however, about whether these classic rec-
ommendations apply in the Chinese setting.
Future liberalization of Chinese outbound invest-
ments may render standard tax policy recommenda-
tions more cogent. For example, when Chinese indi-
viduals are allowed to invest overseas through ap-
proved investment funds, principles of CEN and CIN
may be more applicable. In the immediate future,
however, general policy towards the export of capital
will likely remain hesitant and wavering, headline-
grabbing deals notwithstanding. Tax policy will con-
stitute no exception to this general policy ambiguity.
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